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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

REGINA DE CASAS DIAZ, } Case No. 2:17-cv-04216-JDE
Plaintiff, }
v. }
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting }
Commissioner of Social Security, }
Defendant. }
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Plaintiff Regina de Casas Diaz (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint on June 6, 2017, seeking review of denials of her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”). Dkt. No. 1. The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Dkt. Nos. 13, 14. In accordance with the Court’s Order Re: Procedures in Social Security Appeal, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation on February 20, 2018, addressing their respective positions. Dkt. No. 20 (“Jt. Stip.”). The Court has taken the Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument and as such, this matter now is ready for decision.

I.

BACKGROUND

4 On July 11 2013, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability
5 beginning April 13, 2012. Administrative Record (“AR”) 183-86, 187-92. After
6 her application was denied initially (AR 111-15) and on reconsideration (AR
7 117-21), Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on
8 September 30, 2015. AR 35-58. Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and
9 testified at the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), as did
10 Carmen Roman, a vocational expert. *Id.*

11 On October 30, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff
12 was not disabled. AR 9-34. The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the
13 following severe impairments: “mild right carpal tunnel syndrome; labrum tear
14 of the bilateral shoulders; bilateral shoulders tendinitis bursitis; bilateral knee
15 tendinitis/bursitis; degenerative changes of the cervical spine; and degenerative
16 changes of the lumbar spine.” Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an
17 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a
18 listed impairment. AR 19. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual
19 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with the following
20 limitations: Plaintiff can (1) not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; (2) only
21 occasionally perform postural activities; (3) occasionally reach overhead
22 bilaterally; (4) frequently handle bilaterally (including hand controls); and (5)
23 not do work that requires the ability to speak English and must avoid
24 vibration. AR 20. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was incapable of
25 performing past relevant work as a kitchen supervisor or short order cook. AR
26 27. However, the ALJ found that there were jobs that existed in significant
27 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including: small
28 parts assembler (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 929.587-010),

1 motel cleaner, (DOT 323.687-014), and gluer (DOT 795.687-014). AR 28.
2 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a “disability,” as
3 defined in the Social Security Act. Id.

4 Plaintiff filed a request with the Appeals Council for review of the ALJ’s
5 decision. AR 7-8. On April 4, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
6 request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final
7 decision. AR 1-6. This action followed.

8 **II.**

9 **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

10 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the
11 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision
12 should be upheld if they are free from legal error and supported by substantial
13 evidence based on the record as a whole. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d
14 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th
15 Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
16 person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v.
17 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less
18 than a preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports
19 a finding, the reviewing court “must review the administrative record as a
20 whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts
21 from the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720
22 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or
23 reversing,” the reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment” for that of
24 the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
25 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one
26 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are
27 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). However, a
28 court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision “and may

1 not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue,
2 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).

3 Lastly, even when the ALJ commits legal error, the Court upholds the
4 decision where that error is harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. An error is
5 harmless if it is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,”
6 or if “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency
7 explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
8 492 (citation omitted).

9 **III.**

10 **DISCUSSION**

11 The parties present one disputed issue: “whether the ALJ sustained his
12 burden at step five of the sequential evaluation?” Jt. Stip. at 4. Plaintiff
13 contends that she lacks the physical and language abilities to perform the
14 occupations identified by the ALJ. Id. at 5. The Commissioner responds that,
15 relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff could
16 perform the representative occupations identified at step 5 of the sequential
17 disability evaluation. Id. at 8-9.

18 **A. Legal Standard**

19 If a claimant establishes that he is unable to perform his past work at step
20 four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to identify specific
21 jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national economy that [a] claimant
22 can perform despite [his] identified limitations.” Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d
23 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(g). At step five, the
24 ALJ may rely on the DOT and testimony from a VE to assess a claimant’s
25 ability to perform certain jobs in light of his RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566(e);
26 404.1569; 404.1566(d); Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685,
27 689 (9th Cir. 2009). As part of this process, occupational information provided
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1 by a VE should generally be consistent with the DOT. SSR 00-04, 2000 WL
2 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000).

3 However, when there is an apparent conflict between the VE's testimony
4 and the DOT, the ALJ must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict
5 from the VE before relying on the VE to support a determination or decision
6 about whether the claimant is disabled. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149,
7 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). In order for a VE's testimony to be fairly characterized as
8 in conflict with the DOT, the conflict must be "obvious or apparent." Lamear
9 v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gutierrez v. Colvin,
10 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016)); Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845-46
11 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that "when there is an apparent conflict between the
12 [VE's] testimony and the DOT – for example, expert testimony that a claimant
13 can perform an occupation involving DOT requirements that appear to be
14 more than the claimant can handle – the ALJ is required to reconcile the
15 inconsistency); see also SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 ("When there is
16 an apparent unresolved conflict between VE or [vocational specialist 'VS']
17 evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for
18 the conflict before relying on the VE or VS evidence to support a determination
19 or decision about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level, as
20 part of the adjudicator's duty to fully develop the record, the adjudicator will
21 inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.").

22 **B. Analysis**

23 1. Reaching Limitation

24 Plaintiff argues that the DOT descriptions of all of the jobs identified by
25 the VE conflict with the limitations contained in Plaintiff's RFC regarding her
26 reaching limitation. Jt. Stip. at 9-14. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff's
27 limitation to "occasional" overhead reaching conflicts with the descriptions of
28 all three occupations the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform, which

1 require “frequent” reaching. Id. at 9. She further argues that the ALJ failed to
2 resolve an obvious conflict between her RFC and the DOT descriptions for the
3 representative occupations. Id. at 10.

4 The Ninth Circuit has recently decided two cases involving claims that
5 an ALJ failed to reconcile “obvious and apparent” conflicts between VE
6 testimony and DOT descriptions. In Gutierrez, the court held that the ALJ,
7 who found that the plaintiff had an RFC that limited lifting above the
8 shoulder, “did not err by not asking the [VE] more specific questions regarding
9 a claimant’s ability to reach overhead as part of a cashier’s job.” 844 F.3d at
10 806-07. The court found no obvious or apparent conflict between the DOT’s
11 description of a cashier’s responsibilities and the RFC’s limitation, noting “not
12 every job requires the ability to reach overhead,” and found, as “anyone who’s
13 made a trip to the corner grocery store” knows, bi-lateral overhead reaching is
14 not a likely or foreseeable part of cashiering duties. Id. at 808.

15 By contrast, in Lamear, the Ninth Circuit held that an ALJ erred in
16 not questioning a VE about a conflict between a claimant’s limitations and
17 the DOT descriptions. 865 F.3d at 1205-06. The ALJ had found that the
18 claimant could only occasionally “handle, finger and feel with the left
19 hand.” Id. at 1205. The ALJ accepted, without further questioning, a VE’s
20 opinion that the claimant could perform work which, under the DOT
21 descriptions required, workers to “‘frequently’ engage in handling,
22 fingering, and reaching.” Id. The DOT was silent as to whether such
23 actions required both hands. Id. The court concluded that the descriptions
24 “strongly suggest[ed] that it is likely and foreseeable” that requirements of
25 the occupations conflicted with the RFC, requiring evidence to justify or
26 explain the apparent inconsistency. Id. at 1206-06. The court in Lamear
27 reiterated that the “‘requirement for an ALJ to ask follow up questions is
28 fact-dependent.’” 865 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808).

1 However, the court instructed that an ALJ “should ordinarily ask the VE to
2 explain in some detail why there is no conflict between the DOT and the
3 applicant’s RFC.” Id. The court concluded that when a conflict is found, if
4 the record, the applicable DOT, or “common experience” do not reconcile
5 the conflict, the error is not harmless. Id. at 1206.

6 Here, the ALJ did ask the VE to note any deviation between his
7 opinion testimony and the DOT. AR 54. However, “[t]he ALJ is not
8 absolved of this duty [to reconcile conflicts] merely because the VE
9 responds ‘yes’ when asked if her testimony is consistent with the DOT.”
10 Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2014) (cited approvingly in
11 Lamear, 865 F.3d at 1205 n.3). In fact, “[w]hen there is an apparent
12 conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT . . . the
13 ALJ is required to reconcile the inconsistency. Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 846.

14 The DOT descriptions of small parts assembler, motel cleaner, and gluer
15 each state that reaching may be frequent, that is, from one-third to two-thirds
16 of the time. DOT 929.587-010, 323.687-014, and 795.687-014. At the
17 administrative hearing, the VE testified that a person limited to occasional
18 bilateral overhead reaching could perform these occupations. AR 55-56. The
19 reaching limitation was included in Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 20. The Court finds
20 that this limitation is at odds with the DOT descriptions and what common
21 experience would dictate the work of a motel cleaner.¹

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23 ¹ Cleans rooms and halls in commercial establishments, such as hotels,
24 restaurants, clubs, beauty parlors, and dormitories, performing any combination of
25 following duties: Sorts, counts, folds, marks, or carries linens. Makes beds.
26 Replenishes supplies, such as drinking glasses and writing supplies. Checks wraps
27 and renders personal assistance to patrons. Moves furniture, hangs drapes, and rolls
28 carpets. Performs other duties as described under CLEANER (any industry) I Master
Title. May be designated according to type of establishment cleaned as Beauty Parlor
Cleaner (personal ser.); Motel Cleaner (hotel & rest.); or according to area cleaned as
Sleeping Room Cleaner (hotel & rest.). DOT 323.687-014.

1 In addition to the DOT's reference to frequent reaching, the tasks
2 described include tasks for which "overhead work" appears reasonably likely
3 and foreseeable to occur. For a motel cleaner, overhead work seems
4 reasonably likely and foreseeable in connection with frequent placing of linens
5 and towels in overhead storage, overhead dusting, and cleaning of raised
6 fixtures, mirrors, and windows, as well as the DOT's reference to "hang[ing]
7 drapes." See DOT 323.687-014.

8 Although the DOT description does not specify the direction of the
9 reaching and does not expressly require "overhead" reaching, the Court finds
10 that the ALJ was faced with an apparent conflict between the VE's testimony
11 and tasks that are "essential, integral, or expected" to be performed by a motel
12 cleaner. Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808. Having found that a conflict was obvious
13 or apparent, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in not inquiring further of the
14 VE to clarify the conflict with respect to this occupation.

15 However, the Court finds no obvious or apparent conflict between the
16 VE's testimony and the DOT descriptions for small parts assembler² and gluer³

18 ² Couples and packages nuts and bolts: Screws nut on bolt by hand and holds
19 nut in chuck of nut-turning machine that spins and tightens nut on bolt. Weighs or
20 counts specified amounts of nuts and bolts, and records number of units on
21 production form. Pushes box or carton along bench or onto conveyor. May tie long
bolts into bundles, using wire. May feed nuts and bolts into hopper of machine that
automatically couples and packages nuts and bolts. DOT 929.587-010.

22 ³ Glues material such as paper, cloth, leather, wood, metal, glass, rubber, or
23 plastic together, following specified procedures: Applies adhesive to surface of
24 material by brushing, spraying, dipping, rolling, holding material against rotating
saturated brush, or feeding part between saturated rollers. Presses glued materials
25 together manually, presses material with hand roller, or clamps materials in fixture to
bond material together and set glue. May perform limited assembly of preglued
26 material. May trim excess material from cemented parts. May wipe surplus adhesive
from seams, using cloth or sponge. May visually inspect completed work. May be
27 designated according to article glued as Arrow-Point Attacher (toy-sport equip.);
Gasket Attacher (machinery mfg.); Nock Applier (toy-sport equip.); Pad Attacher

1 with respect to overhead reaching. Although the DOT descriptions reference
2 “frequent reaching,” as the Ninth Circuit has held, “not every job that involves
3 reaching involves reaching overhead.” Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808. Nothing in
4 the DOT descriptions refer to activities that appear to involve overhead work,
5 let alone frequent overhead work. The ALJ did not err in not inquiring further.

6 Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in not reconciling the apparent
7 conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT description for motel
8 cleaner with respect to overhead reaching, but did not err on that issue with
9 respect to the occupations of gluer and small parts assembler. Because the
10 Court finds below that the ALJ also erred with respect to the language
11 limitation, and as that error affects all three occupations, a harmless error
12 analysis solely as to the issue of reaching/motel cleaner is unnecessary.

13 2. Language Limitation

14 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to resolve the conflict
15 between Plaintiff’s inability to speak English and the DOT’s language
16 requirement for the three jobs identified by the VE. Jt. Stip. at 7-8. The
17 Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s testimony
18 because: (1) Plaintiff’s past work demonstrates her ability to communicate well
19 in her native language and could extend that ability to future work; (2)
20 Plaintiff’s language limitation is tangential to her alleged disabilities; and (3)
21 the VE was clearly aware of the language limitation when considering
22 representative occupations Plaintiff could perform. Id. at 14-18.

23 The Commissioner’s first argument, that past work shows Plaintiff’s
24 ability to perform future work despite language limitations, has been rejected
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26 (any industry); Sample Mounter (any industry); or according to gluing method used
27 as Adhesive Sprayer (any industry). May be designated: Box Coverer, Hand (paper
28 goods); Glue Spreader (furniture); Paper-Cone Maker (electron. comp.); Rubber
Attacher (toy-sport equip.). DOT 795.687-014.

1 in other cases. See, e.g., Mora v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5076450, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
2 Dec. 1, 2008) (finding that Commissioner’s “conclusory statement” that
3 plaintiff had worked as maid in past showed that she could perform very
4 similar job despite illiteracy “is not persuasive evidence to support a deviation
5 from a DOT requirement”); see also Obeso v. Colvin, 2015 WL 10692651, at
6 *16 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2015) (“The Ninth Circuit . . . has already
7 resoundingly rejected the argument that a claimant’s previous[] performance of
8 work requiring a higher language level somehow excused the ALJ from
9 explaining how the claimant’s language limitations would impact her ability to
10 find and perform a similar job or the requirements of the jobs identified by the
11 VE.”) (citing Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001)).

12 The Commissioner’s second argument, that Plaintiff’s language
13 limitation is tangential to her physical impairments, ignores the fact that the
14 Commissioner bears the burden at step five of proving that Plaintiff can
15 perform other work existing in substantial numbers in the national economy,
16 given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §
17 416.912(g); Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257, 1261 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000).
18 Literacy and the ability to communicate in English are part of the calculus
19 when considering education as a vocational factor. 20 C.F.R. §§404.1564(b)(1),
20 (b)(5); 416.964(b)(1), (b)(5). Thus, although literacy or education level is a
21 vocational factor relevant only to the step five inquiry and not to the existence
22 of a disability, Silveira, 204 F.3d at 1261 n.14, the ALJ must “definitively
23 explain” the impact of a claimant’s language skills on her ability to find and
24 perform either past relevant work or alternative work. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 848.
25 The Commissioner does not argue that the ALJ provided such an explanation
26 nor does the Court find such explanation in its review of the record.

27 Lastly, with respect to the Commissioner’s third argument, that the VE
28 was implicitly aware of Plaintiff’s language limitation and thus presumably

1 took it into account in identifying the three occupations, the argument misses
2 the point of the ALJ's duty to resolve apparent conflicts. The fact that the VE
3 may have had unexpressed justifications in his mind is precisely the problem; it
4 is the duty of the ALJ to reconcile apparent conflicts by asking questions of the
5 VE to put such justifications on the record. The primary inquiries are whether
6 an obvious or apparent conflict existed between the VE's testimony and the
7 DOT and, if so, whether the ALJ resolved it. See Lamear, 865 F.3d at 1205-06.

8 At the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE to identify
9 occupations that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that a
10 hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's limitations could perform. AR 54. One
11 such limitation was that there "be no requirement for the ability to speak
12 English." Id. The VE identified three representative occupations such a
13 hypothetical individual could perform: small parts assembler, motel cleaner,
14 and gluer. AR 55-56. Plaintiff's counsel asked the VE whether the occupations
15 require the ability to speak English. AR 57. The VE testified that they did not.
16 Id. In his decision, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC with a limitation that
17 Plaintiff "cannot do work that requires the ability to speak English." AR 20.
18 The ALJ relied on the VE's testimony and found that Plaintiff could perform
19 the occupations the VE identified at the administrative hearing. AR 28.

20 Despite the VE's conclusory testimony, each of the occupations the ALJ
21 identified at step five of the sequential evaluation require a language level of 1.
22 See DOT 929.587-010, 323.687-014, and 795.687-014.⁴ The language level 1 is
23

24 ⁴ The occupations require: the ability to "[r]ecognize meaning of 2,500 (two-or-three-
25 syllable) words. Read at rate of 95-120 words per minute. Compare similarities and
26 differences between words and between series of numbers"; "[p]rint simple sentences
27 containing subject, verb, and object, and series of numbers, names, and addresses";
28 and "[s]peak simple sentences, using normal word order, and present and past
tenses." DOT 929.587-010, 323.687-014, and 795.687-014.

1 the lowest language development contemplated by the DOT. Castillo v.
2 Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 54387, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016); see
3 also Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 2002) ("basic literacy
4 [defined as a vocabulary of 2,500 words, the ability to read about 100 words a
5 minute, and the ability to print simple sentences] is essential for every job in
6 the economy"). A plain reading of the DOT's language level 1 definition
7 requires language ability more advanced than someone who cannot speak
8 English. Thus, the Court finds this presented an obvious conflict with the
9 limitation that Plaintiff cannot perform work that requires the ability to speak
10 English. See Gutierrez, 844 F.3d at 808 (to constitute a conflict, the difference
11 between the VE's testimony and the DOT's listings must concern DOT
12 requirements which are essential, integral, or expected). The conflict triggered
13 the ALJ's obligation to inquire further. See Lamear, 865 F.3d at 1205.

14 The Ninth Circuit has held that "in order for an ALJ to rely on a job
15 description in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that fails to comport with
16 a claimant's noted limitations, the ALJ must definitively explain this
17 deviation." Pinto, 249 F.3d at 847. The Court finds no such explanation in the
18 ALJ's decision nor does the Commissioner cite to such an explanation.

19 Numerous cases, particularly post-Gutierrez and post-Lamear, have
20 found error in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Chaoprasrihomkha v.
21 Berryhill, 2018 WL 287303, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2018) (finding error where
22 the VE did not provide an explanation for how a claimant could perform work
23 identified by VE given his limited English); Oliva-Hernandez v. Berryhill, 2017
24 WL 6403085, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding ALJ erred in failing
25 accepting VE's testimony that a functionally illiterate individual could perform
26 occupations at language level 1); Gomez v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 2676400, at *3
27 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2017) ("the VE's testimony that a person with Plaintiff's
28 educational background could perform the job of sewing-machine operator

1 conflicted with the DOT because that job involves Level 2 language skills . . .
2 [t]his conflict required an explanation.”) (internal citation and footnote
3 omitted); Yang v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 5878203, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 29,
4 2017) (remanding for failure to resolve conflict between the VE’s testimony
5 and the English requirements outlined by the DOT); Obeso, 2015 WL
6 10692651, at *15-16 (remanding a case where the ALJ found a claimant with
7 limited English could perform occupations at language level 1 based on the
8 VE’s testimony and “the ALJ did not offer any explanation for her deviation
9 from the DOT”); Mora, 2008 WL 5076450, at *4 (remanding because “the VE
10 failed to explain the impact Plaintiff’s illiteracy has on her ability to perform
11 her prior work and failed to account for the deviation from the Language Level
12 1 requirement set forth in the DOT for the job of a hotel maid.”); but see
13 Herrera v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3572227, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2014)
14 (decided before Gutierrez and Lamear); Landeros v. Astrue, 2012 WL
15 2700384, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (same). The Court agrees with the post-
16 Gutierrez and post-Lamear cases finding error in this circumstances.

17 The Commissioner suggests that further inquiry was not warranted as
18 Plaintiff’s counsel asked the VE whether the representative occupations could
19 be performed without speaking English, and the VE confirmed they could. Jt.
20 Stip. at 15 (citing AR 55-57). However, the VE’s one-word response does not
21 constitute an explanation. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th
22 Cir. 2008) (finding error where “ALJ did not identify what aspect of the VE’s
23 experience warranted deviation from the DOT, and did not point to any
24 evidence in the record other than the VE’s sparse testimony for the deviation”).

25 The Commissioner also asserts that “by Plaintiff’s logic, she would be
26 unable to perform *any* occupation whatsoever because every job in the DOT
27 would require some ability to speak English.” Jt. Stip. at 15. The assertion
28 misconstrues the nature of Plaintiff’s argument and the nature of the inquiry. A

1 claimant bears the burden of showing disability at steps one through four of the
2 sequential evaluation. However, if, after step four, it is found that the claimant
3 has met her burden at each step and has shown that she is unable to perform
4 her past relevant work, a limited burden shifts to the Commissioner to show
5 that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
6 perform, given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §
7 416.912(g). If the ALJ seeks to meet that burden by relying upon testimony
8 from a VE about jobs that the claimant can perform which appears to conflict
9 with the DOT descriptions of those jobs, the ALJ must elicit satisfactory
10 testimony reconciling that conflict. The ALJ here did not do so.

11 In light of the ALJ's failure to resolve the conflict between the VE's
12 testimony and the language requirements outlined by the DOT, the ALJ did
13 not apply the proper legal standards in this. This error is not harmless since no
14 additional jobs were identified. Accordingly, the case must be remanded so
15 that the record can be developed in this area.

16 **C. Remand for Further Proceedings Is Appropriate**

17 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within this
18 Court's discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000)
19 (as amended). Where no useful purpose would be served by further
20 administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is
21 appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits.
22 Id. at 1179 (noting that "the decision of whether to remand for further
23 proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings"); Benecke v.
24 Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004).

25 However, remand is appropriate where there are outstanding issues that
26 must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made and it is not
27 clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant
28 disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated. Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336

1 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,
2 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that courts have “flexibility to remand for
3 further proceedings when the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to
4 whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social
5 Security Act.”). Here, remand is appropriate for the ALJ to further inquire of
6 the VE regarding the apparent conflicts identified herein and conduct such
7 other proceedings as are warranted.

8 **IV.**

9 **CONCLUSION**

10 For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security
11 Commissioner is REVERSED and the action is REMANDED for further
12 proceedings.

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14 Dated: March 07, 2018

15 
16 JOHN D. EARLY
17 United States Magistrate Judge